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The 1960 Laotian coups brought about a pivotal change of government in the Kingdom of Laos. General Phoumi Nosavan established himself as the strongman running Laos in a bloodless coup on 25 December 1959. He would be himself overthrown on 10 August 1960 by the young paratrooper captain who had backed him in the 1959 coup. When Captain Kong Le impressed the American officials underwriting Laos as a potential communist, they backed Phoumi's return to power in November and December 1960. In turn, the Russians backed Kong Le as their proxy in this Cold War standoff. After the Battle of Vientiane ended in his defeat, Kong Le withdrew northward to the strategic Plain of Jars on 16 December 1960. Having taken an independent stance in the Laotian Civil War, Kong Le and his ''Forces Armee Neutraliste'' would remain an unpredictable influence upon the war until 1974. ==Overview and background== Beginning on 23 December 1950, the United States began military aid to the French administration of the Kingdom of Laos as they fought the First Indochina War. U.S. support would increase to the point of underwriting the Lao budget in its entirety. The rationale behind the support was that it was in American interests to combat the communist insurrectionists in Laos as part of the Cold War. Banned by treaty from stationing an overt Military Assistance Advisory Group in Laos, in December 1955 the U.S instead chose to establish a "civilian" military aid office within the U.S. embassy in Vientiane. The Programs Evaluation Office was charged with channeling war material to the Lao military.〔Castle, pp. 9–20.〕 Of the 68 ethnic minorities that comprised the Lao population, the Lao Loum numerically predominated. They dwelt along the Mekong River Valley along the southern border with the Kingdom of Thailand. The King of Laos and most of the ruling class of Laos were Lao Loum. About 20 of these influential lowland Lao families actually controlled Laos.〔Castle, pp. 5, 20, 141.〕 With the PEO confined to office work, distribution of military goods took place without PEO followup. From 1955 to 1958, the U.S. would sink $202 million into Laos. This aid led to corruption as it was siphoned off by recipients.〔Anthony & Sexton, pp. 15, 19–20, 28–29.〕 As Bernard Fall noted from personal observation, the support of the Lao military was for political reasons, and not necessarily for self-defense. The Lao soldiers were among the most highly paid in the world. They cost an average of about $1,000 apiece annually; the global average for a soldier's pay was $848 per capita. Many Lao soldiers were fictional recruits, with their pay being siphoned off by Lao officers. Junior Lao officers afforded expensive villas. More disheartening to PEO, there were thievish Americans in the program.〔Fall, pp. 163–166.〕 The basic Lao economy was so underdeveloped that an artificial economy developed. U.S. dollars funded imports that were sold commercially on the open market. The resultant Lao kips went to underwrite the Lao military. These payments were also subsequently turned over into foreign goods. With no controls on the imports, the quality and utility of provisions were often ignored.〔 Fall summarized the result by quoting a pro-American Lao officer, Sisouk na Champassak: "Black market deals in American aid dollars reached such proportions that the Pathet Lao needed no propaganda to turn the rural people against the townspeople."〔Fall, p. 165.〕 This rampant boodling would provoke the ire of young Royal Lao Army Captain Kong Le. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「1960 Laotian coups」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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